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INSERTING THE LAST REMAINING PIECES INTO THE
TAKINGS PUZZLE
DOUGLAS W. KMIEC"
I have previously opined that the Supreme Court has effective-
ly solved the takings puzzle,' and it has. Like 1000-piece puzzles
in the game room of a large family, however, near the end, a few
pieces are missing. In truth, the problem is not so much missing
as ill-fitting pieces left over from other puzzles long ago forgotten
and now deserving abandonment. The ill-fitting takings pieces
are Agins v. City of Tiburon,' and the "ad hockly"-edged Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.? These cases per-
petuate an overly deferential standard of review and proof bur-
dens that undermine the goal of fairly balancing the reciprocally
defined concepts of property and police power. Worse, these deci-
sions mask a virtually insurmountable presumption of constitu-
tionality that has too often been a presumption in favor of exclu-
sion, felt most disturbingly by the least affluent.4 Troubling also
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1. See Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle,
19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 147 (1995).
2. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
3. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
4. From its earliest forms, zoning was designed to exclude-on the basis of race and
ethnicity. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES
KRIER, PROPERTY 992 (3d ed. 1993) (citing STANISLAW J. MAKIESi, THE POLITIcs OF
ZONING (1966)); SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN (1969) (describing a New York ordi-
nance keeping immigrant voters out of more fashionable commercial centers)). Zoning
ordinances were also designed to exclude people on the basis of wealth. See generally
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975) (excluding low- and moderate-income families from a municipality). William M.
Randle, in his article Professors, Reformers, Bureaucrats, and Cronies: The Players in Eu-
clid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAMi 31 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S.
Kayden eds., 1989), explores the racial exclusion motivations lingering beneath the origi-
nal Euclid ordinance upheld as constitutional in Ambler Realty Co. u. Village of Euclid,
297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924), reu'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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is that the AginslPenn Central presumption of the regulation's
validity is a presumption against freedom of ownership, respon-
sibly defined as encompassing both individual right and duty.'
The effects of this presumption could not be understood while the
takings puzzle remained unsolved because property scholarship
and its sub-area of takings were traveling simply in contesting
camps, lobbing aphorisms of libertarian autonomy against benign
statist redistribution.6 Some of this still goes on, of course, but
with more subtle and prudent insight, rather than simple parti-
sanship, discerning property to be a device mixing "independence
and cooperation" by which we form community.'
What follows is a brief recapitulation of the Supreme Court's
analytical resolution of the takings problem and a case-specific
examination of some areas where out-of-date Agins and Penn
Central-generated pieces do not fit into the carefully arranged
precedental framework of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,' Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,' and Dolan
v. City of Tigard.1°
5. As Richard Epstein wrote in response to the presumption of validity:
The obvious rejoinder is to ask why the Court should ever 'indulge' an
assumption that this average reciprocity of advantage normally will ap-
ply, in light of the enormous political pressures from both minority fac-
tions and determined majorities that so often lead legislatures
astray.... [T]he average reciprocity of advantage in each case should be
established by the evidence, rather than presumed as a matter of law.
Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci- A Tangled Web of Ex-
pectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1374 (1993).
6. Compare MARK L. POLLOT, GRAND THEFT AND PETTY LARCENY-PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN AMERICA (1993) (taking libertarian policy most seriously), with JENNIFER
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
261-62 (1990) (blurring the essential distinction between common law property and
statutory privilege).
7. See Carol M. Rose, Property As the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
329, 365 (1996). Professor Rose astutely observed: "But such heroic rhetoric rests on
the quite mistaken notion that this most intensely social of institutions hinges on
individualism alone, whereas in fact it thoroughly mixes independence and coopera-
tion." Id. Somewhat understating the significance of her observations, Professor Rose
found property to be not a keystone right, but an educative institution. See id. It is
property's capacity to both connect and insulate us from community, however, that
gives it this subtle educative, yet powerful, capacity. See id.
8. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
9. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
10. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
TAKINGS PUZZLE PIECES
I. THE SOLUTION
The straightforward purpose of the Takings Clause is to avoid
the disproportionate placement of public burdens upon a single
property owner."
Yet, litigation over the clause has been difficult because it pits
two indeterminate concepts-property and police power-against
each other. Knowing where private rights end and public power
begins is the essence of the quandary. Until recently, the diffi-
culty revealed no sign of abating. Arguably, Lochner v. New
York 2 blocked the path. Lochner, of course, is the talismanic
name for the proposition that federal judges ought not legislate
from the bench. 3 Judicial restraint is a commendable principle
born of separation of powers doctrine and, in the land-use con-
text, of federalism. Yet, misplaced restraint in the face of gov-
ernment overreaching defeats constitutional purpose and is
about as helpful as misplacing the explanatory picture on a puz-
zle box cover.
A. The Natural Law-Objective Reality of Property
The resolution of the takings puzzle depends upon realizing
that the judicial protection of legitimate private property rights
is not tantamount to inappropriate judicial theorizing about so-
cial policy. Why are these situations different? In Lochner, the
majority had no objective standard by which to say that a leg-
islative specification of the maximum number of hours to be
worked by a baker was right or wrong.'4 Reasonable minds
11. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987) ("It is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendments just compensa-
tion provision is 'designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole'." (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The determination that governmental action
constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather
than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the
public interest.").
12. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13. See Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitu-
tional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1991).
14. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64 (summarizing the Court's holding).
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could differ as to whether working more than sixty hours per
week should be allowed, and the Court had no superior institu-
tional resources or textual constitutional basis to say otherwise.
In such case, what is right and wrong is mostly a matter of
positive law."5 By contrast, in takings cases, what is right or
wrong in terms of acceptable levels of regulation is governed
more overtly by the objective, natural law 6 basis of common
law property rights.
American constitutional history declares Jeremy Bentham to
be mistaken: property and law are not "born together," and they
do not die together either. 7 Private property preexists govern-
15. It is not entirely the product of positive law because at some point labor ar-
rangements can be so oppressive that they threaten the human nature of the labor-
er. Slavery is the obvious example.
16. Natural law assumes that "every person and every thing has been created
with an inherent or intrinsic nature and that no human person or positive law can
supersede this nature." DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER 29-30
(1992). Natural law is an ancient concept. For example, Cicero described it as "the
highest reason, implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and
forbids the opposite." MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, LAWS-BOOK I, reprinted in THE
GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS: SELECTED READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 42, 44 (Clar-
ence Morris ed., 1959). Natural law profoundly influenced this country's founders.
Chester Antieau observed that "it would be amazing if any Revolutionary leader of
the Commonwealth could be found who did not subscribe to the doctrines of natural
law and right." Chester J. Antieau, Natural Rights and the FoundingFathers-The
Virginians, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 43, 43 (1960). More recently, Philip Hamburger
has observed that early "Americans tended to take for granted that natural law had
a foundation in the physical.world and yet had moral implications." Philip A. Ham-
burger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J.
907, 923 (1993). At its philosophical essence, natural law assumes (1) that man is
intelligent, (2) that reality exists, and (3) with his intelligence, man can apprehend
reality and make decisions that advance his defined nature. A classic treatment on
these aspects of natural law is JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS
109-23 (1960). More modern expositions can be found in HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL
INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTrrUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION (1994) and
STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION (1994). In addition, a read-
able and concise summary of natural law is CHARLES E. RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE
NATURAL LAW: WHAT IT IS AND WHY WE NEED IT (1993).
The natural law of property has also been examined. See Douglas W. Kmiec,
The Coherence of the Natural Law of Property, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 367 (1991). For
purposes of takings jurisprudence and the present Article, it is important to under-
stand that property is a mixed natural and positive law concept, an insight derived
from Blackstone. See id. at 370-71. Thus, part of what we characterize as a property
right does not derive from legislative enactment, but part does.
17. But cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-13 (C.K. Ogden ed.,
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ment and is protected not merely because this or that law may
be in place, but because it advances the nature of the human
person more effectively and, directly than alternative forms of
property distribution.18 Furthermore, insofar as human nature
predates the origin of the American republic, the manifestation
of that nature in private property has a claim to special solici-
tude. 9 Madison made this point when he described a primary
purpose of the newly formed government of the United States to
be the protection or preservation of property." If all property
rights originated with legislative enactment, Madison's state-
ment would be nonsensical or at best tautological-the primary
1931). Bentham seems to confuse the existence of a property right or expectation,
which is part of human nature and therefore deserving of protection, with the en-
forcement of the expectation, which the law or some other means of force may with-
hold. As Professor Rose has observed, "Bentham had little use for the notion of nat-
ural rights of any sort." Rose, supra note 7, at 330 n.5. Of course, in this deficiency.
Bentham confesses his inability to understand a republic like ours founded explicitly
and unequivocally on "the Laws of Nature and Nature's God." See THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
18. Law students are generally familiar with the economic argument for private
property based in utility, see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,
57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967), but they are less familiar with the relationships that
exist between property and person or property and community. An early observer of
the natural law effect of property on the formation of community was Alexis de
Tocqueville, who appreciated that the American fascination with trade (or property)
helped to forge social and moral bonds and an attitude of service or meeting the
needs of others. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 68 (Phillips
Bradley ed., 1995); 2 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra, at 115-24. Modern religious justifica-
tion for private property is much to the same effect:
The appropriation of property is legitimate for guaranteeing the freedom
and dignity of persons and for helping each of them to meet his basic -
needs and the needs of those in his charge .... The universal destina-
tion of goods remains primordial, even if the promotion of the common
good requires respect for the right to private property and its exercise.
UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, INC.-LBRERA EDITRICE VATCANA, CATE-
CHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2402-03 (1994); see also Margaret J. Radin, Prop-
erty and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 977-78 (1982) (discussing her conception of
the special sanctity of the home premised upon the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel).
19. See supra note 16 (stating that the protection of property rights as a natural
law concept has played a central role in the history of the United States).
20. James Madison wrote: "Government is instituted to protect property of every
sort.... This being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which
impartially secures to every man, whatever is .his own." James Madison, Property,
NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Rob-
ert A. Rutland et a. eds., 1983).
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purpose of government would then be to protect or preserve
whatever government determined to be its primary purpose.
To be sure, property is an admixture of natural and positive
law. The natural law reality of property's common law manifes-
tation, however, does supply the judiciary with an independent
basis for evaluating the fairness of legislative enactment. The
Court understood this early in this century, but regretfully wan-
dered. For example, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,21
the Court accepted, at the level of general theory, that police
power regulation is to be linked to the prevention of harm, de-
fined in terms of common law nuisance principles.' The Court
would give local legislatures a level of latitude in interpreting
what is and is not harmful, but the Court reassuringly and wise-
ly said that it would not forsake its role of determining where
regulation as applied to particular parcels exceeded flexible, yet
still perceptible, limits on government power.' Immediately af-
ter Euclid, the Court kept its word,' but perhaps frightened or
confused by Lochner and by a president threatening to remake
the Court in his own image,' the Justices abandoned this duty
of limiting government encroachment for a half-century.
During that extended period, establishing a regulatory taking
was precluded effectively by the skewed deference of the rational
basis standard or the insuperable difficulty of proving that regu-
lation deprives property of all value. Prior to recent case devel-
opments in the Supreme Court, a regulatory taking would be
found largely where regulation could not be conceived as bearing
21. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
22. See id. at 394-95. Professor Rose has observed correctly that modern property
law doctrine is largely, though not exclusively, "bottom-up." Rose, supra note 7, at 338.
[Niuisance law defines the boundaries of property by reference to the
'reasonable' practices of ordinary people. Even a subject as formalistic as
local zoning very largely reflects the ways that property owners actually
use their land. Indeed, it is arguable that top-down regimes themselves
only derive from usurpations of pre-existing bottom-up property.
Id. at 338-39.
23. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397.
24. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928) (striking down a
zoning classification because it did not advance a legitimate governmental purpose).
25. See generally William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's
"Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347 (describing President Roosevelt's at-
tempt to expand Court membership for ideological purposes during the mid-1930s).
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any relationship to a legitimate state interest or where the tak-
ing denied its owner all economically viable use of the land.2"
Given the weak nature of the rational basis standard, some
courts merged the standards into the single proposition that only
regulation that renders property valueless is subject to takings
challenges." A few courts held that even land-use regulation
contrary to state law may advance "legitimate state interests,"'
perhaps as a corollary to the proposition that the federal consti-
tution does not supply remedies for state law violations.
2 9
B. Physical Occupations and the Common Law Right To
Exclude
The rediscovery of the natural law objective reality of the com-
mon law features of property now offers the Court the prospect
of better resolving takings claims. The first analytical trace of
this rediscovery of the reality of private property occurred, nei-
ther in Nollan nor its rhyming sibling Dolan, but in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp."0 Here, the categorical
protection of the right to exclude emerged from the ancient pro-
tection against trespass."' At first, Loretto seemed both star-
tling and trivial. The constitutional need to compensate for a
four-inch-square box and accompanying cable wire 2 seemed
26. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (upholding a zoning
limitation against a facial challenge).
27. See, e.g., Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Iowa 1994); Finch v. City of
Durham, 384 S.E.2d 8, 16 (N.C. 1989); Gerijo, Inc. v. City of Fairfield, 638 N.E.2d
533, 537 (Ohio 1994).
28. See, e.g., Chesterfield Dev. Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104-
05 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that enacting a zoning plan in violation of state law is
not a basis for a substantive due process claim); Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124,
1126 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that the unlawful denial of a permit is not a taking);
Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988)
(finding that rejecting a site plan in violation of state law is not a basis for a sub-
stantive due process claim); Chiplin Enters., Inc. v. City of Lebanon, 712 F.2d 1524,
1528 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding that a violation of state law is not necessarily a viola-
tion of constitutional rights).
29. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 26 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1944).
30. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
31. See id. at 435.
32. See id. at 422.
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downright silly in the face of the million dollar diminutions that
had not merited compensation. Yet, Loretto's significance was
great because it reminded the Court that no matter how high-
minded the justifications for a public regulatory scheme might
be, in a democratic republic with a natural law foundation, the
objective reality of privately-held property resources limits those
schemes.
As important as was Loretto's reminder, its practical signifi-
cance was less: not much land-use regulation depends directly
upon physical occupation. And, at first, neither the Court nor
land-use players generally realized how directly the analytical
line based upon the common law of property connected Loretto
with Nollan, and later Lucas with Dolan. Nevertheless, with
Nollan, the Court returned more explicitly to the sounder course
of defining property and police power reciprocally in relation to a
state's background principles of property law, especially the com-
mon law of nuisance.3 With heightened scrutiny, now arguably
33. As will be noted later, there is some disagreement among the members of the
Court over what the "background principles of state property law" include. See infra
text accompanying notes 100-05 (comparing Justice Scalia's largely nuisance-based fo-
cus with that of Justice Kennedy, who would include the "whole" law of the state).
It would be foolish for this Article, and with due respect, for the Supreme Court, to
attempt to define the elements of these background principles comprehensively and
inflexibly, independent of time and place or the individual claims of landowners and
the communities in which they reside. As employed in this Article, however, this
much can be said: The background principles are primarily a function of state law
and, as applied to land-use issues, the state laws are bound by the sic utere princi-
ple of common law nuisance, though they also may be subject to statutory modifica-
tions that refine or sharpen nuisance-like considerations. Arguably, this description is
in accord with that adopted by the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992), and Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 387 (1926), in which the Court first delineated the original scope of public land-
use control. See id. ("The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and reg-
ulations, must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for
the public welfare."). The description also reflects our common law history. An im-
plicit claim of the American Revolution was that thereafter, land was no longer held
as privilege or tenure from the crown. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW
OF PROPERTY § 1.7, at 21-22 (1993). Although a few of the original 13 states initially
substituted the state for the king in terms of land tenure, most of the United States
made it clear post-Revolution that land ownership was "allodial" or free of any over-
lord. See id. Within the borders set by the common law of nuisance, and reasonable
statutory extensions thereof, common law ownership includes rights of possession, ex-
clusion, use, profit, and disposition or transfer. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 5,
10 (1936). Specification beyond this can occur only in context or.
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(or at least possibly) to be applied in all land-use takings cas-
es,' the Court gave genuine adverbial and adjectival strength
to the previously feeble recital of "substantially advancing a
legitimate governmental interest," which had become indistinct
from the reasonableness or mere rational basis standards ap-
plied in other economic contexts. 5
C. Essential Nexus-The Proper, Partial Eclipse of Diminution-
in-Value
Although some complained that Nollan broke from prece-
dent,36 in actuality the intervening diminution-in-value cases
from time to time, and from place to place, either because of changes in
the common law, or because of alterations by statute .... At any one
time and place, however, there is a maximum combination of rights, priv-
ileges, powers and immunities ... that is legally possible, and which
constitutes complete property ....
Id. § 5, cmt. e.
As reflected throughout this Article, the Court's ability to resolve the takings
puzzle hinges on its recognition that, as variable or imprecise as this definition of
the background principles of property may be, it is not an empty definition-or at
least, it is not as empty as the rational basis standard employed in Agins and Penn
Central indicates. In this Article, I suggest that particular case authority-dealing
with common law rights to develop; the identification of property interests for pur-
poses of substantive due process analysis; and vested rights theory-should be
brought into line with the Court's recognition of the "background principle" content
of the'Takings Clause. See infra text accompanying notes 118-35. This should not be
misunderstood as a suggestion that the Court "constitutionalize" the definition of
property, however, beyond the general principles articulated in this footnote, and the
large body of state common law that is consistent with it.
34. In Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994), cert, denied,
115 S. Ct. 1961 (1995), Judge Bellacosa wrote for the New York Court of Appeals:
[There is no basis in Nollan itself for concluding that the Supreme
Court decided to apply different takings tests, dependent on whether the
takings were purely regulatory or physical. The Court promulgated a
principle for all property and land-use regulation matters.
Id. at 483. The court invalidated a statute requiring landlords to provide renewal
leases to employees of nonprofit hospitals, relying upon "the judiciary's constitutional
duty to decide this case within appropriate precedental and judicial review tem-
plates, [which requires the court to conclude that] the generalized presumption of
constitutionality accorded to statutes cannot substitute for the fundamental defect [of
the statute], to wit, no substantial advancement of a legitimate State interest . .. .
Id. at 487.
35. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
36. See Norman Williams, Jr., A Narrow Escape? (pts. 1 & 2), 16 ZONING & PLAN.
L. REP. 113 (1993).
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were the aberrations. Not surprisingly, the inventor of the dimi-
nution-in-value standard, Oliver Wendell Holmes, disavowed
America's natural law tradition,37 a trait shared by Justice Da-
vid Souter.38 Yet, it is surely ironic that Justice Holmes's deci-
sion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahons9 has been lionized so
long for assisting individual property rights.40 This is deception.
Holmes's "too far" formulation is about as helpful to a correct
takings outcome as someone-say, on his way to the kitchen
during a commercial break-inserting into a puzzle-in-progress a
piece that deceivingly appears to, but does not, fit. Having ab-
jured properly Herbert Spencer's Social Statics in his famous
Lochner dissent,4 Holmes flayed about for an alternative
37. As a proponent of pragmatism, Holmes tended to overlook even the obvious.
He wrote tellingly: "The jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that
naive state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them and
their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere." Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918).
38. In a remarkably heated, and historically disingenuous, dissent in Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), voiding part of the Indian Gam-
ing Act and finding that Congress may not use its commerce power to override com-
mon law principles of state sovereignty embedded in the Eleventh Amendment, Jus-
tice Souter decided to launch a somewhat nongermane attack (really a denial) of
America's entire natural rights history. See id. at 1177-78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter, among other things, mocked the notion that America was founded
upon "certain vital principles" of natural justice, id. at 1177, arguing based on an
academic book from the 1980s that "Illater jurisprudence" (which he does not identi-
fy) vindicated the view that "the idea that 'first principles' or concepts of 'natural
justice' might take precedence over the Constitution or other positive law 'all but
disappeared in American discourse'." Id. at 1177 (citation omitted). This grievance
that Justice Souter apparently has against the common law, state sovereignty, and
the natural rights of mankind at the foundation of the American republic, see THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("All men are... endowed . . .
with certain unalienable Rights"), is perhaps the best explanation of his rather con-
sistent dissent to the Court's takings cases in Lucas and Dolan. As the Chief Justice
observed for the Court in Seminole Tribe: "in putting forward a new [weakened]
theory of state sovereign immunity, the dissent develops its own vision of the politi-
cal system created by the Framers .... " Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131.
39. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
40. See generally Thomas W. Fahey, Jr. & Richard T. Roznay, Aquifer Protection
in Connecticut: Environmental Land Use Restrictions Run Deep, 68 CONN. B.J. 98,
112 (1994) (stating that it was not until Pennsylvania Coal that the Court found an
"individual right violated when overruling necessity required the 'preservation of life
and property . . . by the sacrifice of that which is less valuable").
41. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's 'Social Statics'.").
1004
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means by which judicial review could continue. He hit upon
diminution-in-value,42 but it has proven to be a pragmatist's
blind alley.
Diminution-in-value tries to assess the "propriety" of a govern-
ment requirement using the non sequitur: "How much did it cost
you?" As a takings standard, diminution-in-value is a side issue,
an ersatz substitute for more searching inquiry into whether the
police power has been asserted in league with, or in opposition
to, the background principles of state property law.43 Even
Penn Central" recognized this with its passing reference to
"reasonable investment-backed" expectations.45 These expecta-
tions are largely common law ones. If the Court is to find the
proper denominator for the loss calculation fraction it speculates
about in Lucas," the answer can be found in these common law
expectations.
More on the missing denominator puzzle piece in a moment,
but first it must be noted that Nollan's primary requirement
that there be an essential nexus between regulatory means and
42. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 ("Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law.").
43. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COM-
itENTARY 279, 304 (1992), arguing for a uniformity principle that would provide:
a strong argument for compensation when the government uses a preser-
vation ban to achieve the same goal [as an acquisition]. The uniformity
rationale also helps explain why the Lucas rule applies only to land,
since the government does not customarily seize personal property for
preservation purposes. It also explains why incidental effects on land val-
ues are irrelevant; unless a regulation is targeted at land use, it is un-
likely to be a covert method of establishing a nature preserve.
Id.
Oddly, however, Professor Farber does not extend his uniformity rationale to
what he calls the large "grey area" that exists between acquisition and preventing a
nuisance. See id at 305. He asserts that this grey area is not the "functional equiv-
alent" to acquisition. See id. at 304-05. With respect, however, that assertion begs
the question of the allocation of the right to develop under the background principles
of state property law. See infra notes 137-49, 206-07 and accompanying text (arguing
that common law rights of development cannot be ipso facto and retroactively de-
clared nonexistent without compensation for the same reason that Professor Farber
finds compensation necessary for a narrower band of acquisition).
44. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
45. See id. at 124.
46. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7 (1992).
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ends47 failed to convey how property and police power are recip-
rocally defined against the backdrop of state property law. Both
the opinion and the opinion's author have been denigrated.48
Some commentators argued for confining the opinion to cases in
which a property concession existed.49 Land-use regulators con-
tended that all the case required was a facile matching of regu-
latory means and ends.5° Thus, if the public end was to con-
struct a bike path over a permit applicant's property, then it
should be a simple matter to require the conveyance of an ease-
ment or fee interest underlying the path.
The manipulation of Nollan in this fashion occasionally is aid-
ed by a generation of efficiency-based instruction in law schools,
portraying all harms merely as competing resource demands.
This perspective blurs the power of property concepts, especially
at common law, to establish causation in legal terms.5' For
Ronald Coase and economic analysis, it is true that polluters
and breathers contend for the same air, and one arguably ratio-
nal way to allocate air is in terms of who values the resource
more highly. However, law is more than economics; law is
also fairness. And fairness is embodied in the common law's rea-
soned respect for private choices that sometimes forego wealth's
redistribution or maximization.
Had the legal community paid full attention, it could have
gleaned from the Court's implicit focus on causation some hint of
the significance of the fairness consideration in the working out
47. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.3 (1987).
48. Jerold Kayden characterizes Justice Scalia's analysis for the Court in Nollan
as being based upon "shoddy scholarship and misguided analysis." Jerold S. Kayden,
Judges As Planners: Limited or General Partners?, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM, supra note 4, at 223, 233.
49. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1608
(1988) ("The decision seems most satisfactorily understood as a further manifestation,
albeit in somewhat surprising form, of the talismanic force of 'permanent physical
occupation' in takings adjudication.").
50. See id.
51. Cf. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42-44
(1960) (discussing, in the absence of transaction cost, the irrelevancy of legal (viz.
property) entitlement to efficient outcomes). A thoughtful rejoinder to Coase on this
issue can be found in Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its
Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979).
52. See Coase, supra note 51, at 41-42.
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of regulatory taking disputes. In Nollan, an important footnote
to the articulated essential nexus standard disclosed this empha-
sis.53 Shortly after Nollan, the point was made explicit in the
dissenting opinion of Justices Scalia and O'Connor in Pennell v.
City of San Jose.' In that case the Court declined-largely on
ripeness grounds-to invalidate a rent control measure that fa-
cially precluded landlords from raising rents if, among other rea-
sons, their particular tenants were down on their luck and suf-
fering personal financial hardship.55 The dissenters properly
saw that the law's facial invalidity derived from its disregard of
causation, and that this statutory defect trumped the ripeness
concern.56 The dissent stated:
Traditional land-use regulation (short of that which totally
destroys the economic value of property) does not violate this
principle because there is a cause-and-effect relationship be-
tween the property use restricted by the regulation and the
social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy. Since the
owner's use of the property is (or, but for the regulation,
would be) the source of the social problem, it cannot be said
that he has been singled out unfairly. Thus, the common zon-
ing regulations requiring subdividers to observe lot-size and
set-back restrictions, and to dedicate certain areas to public
streets, are in accord with our constitutional traditions be-
cause the proposed property use would otherwise be the
cause of excessive congestion.57
53. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987). Justice
Scalia, foreshadowing the Court's opinion in Dolan, wrote:
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California's
attempt to remedy [the various regulatory] problems, although they had
not contributed to [them] more than other coastal landowners, the State's
action, even if otherwise valid, might violate either the incorporated Tak-
ings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.
Id.
54. 485 U.S. 1, 15-24 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. See id. at 15.
56. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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D. Takings and Causation Reattached
Dolan5 advanced the reattachment of takings jurisprudence
and causation. Dolan also limited police power authority to im-
pose land dedication conditions on a permit application to cir-
cumstances in which the dedications are "roughly proportional"
to the needs created by the proposed land use.5" Nominally,
Dolan appears to extend the nexus analysis begun in Nollan. As
the Court suggested in the Nollan footnote referenced previous-
ly,6" however, the essential nexus must connect not only regula-
tory means and ends but also the need for this particular regu-
latory imposition on this particular landowner. Dolan's "rough
proportionality" language thus inserts the causation principle
fully into Nollan's essential nexus, and in so doing, conveys that
government has the burden of justifying the regulation and it
must reconcile its justification with the state's law of property.
As indicated below in the discussion of California's Ehrlich deci-
sion,6 ' the puzzle-solving work that remains is to have state
6 2
and lower federal courts comprehend fully, and apply more wide-
ly, those two requirements.
58. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). For a suggested (and good na-
turedly, humorous) alternative opinion, written and published before the case was
decided, see Douglas W. Kmiec, Clarifying the Supreme Court's Taking Cases-An
Irreverent but Otherwise Unassailable Draft Opinion in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 71
DENv. U. L. REv. 325 (1994).
59. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
60. See supra note 53; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4
(1987).
61. See infra notes 161-258 and accompanying text.
62. Some courts are applying Dolan faithfully and are using the causation princi-
ple discussed in the text of this Article. Because the causation principle is an essen-
tial part of the Fifth Amendments balanced and reciprocal definition of property and
police power, its application, notwithstanding heightened scrutiny, has not uniformly
favored the landowner. Compare Henderson Homes, Inc. v. City of Bothell, 877 P.2d
176 (Wash. 1994) (invalidating a fee-per-lot charge), with Trimen Dev. Co. v. King
County, 877 P.2d 187 (Wash. 1994) (determining that an exaction fee calculated in
reference to the zoning, projected population, and assessed value of a specific site
comports with Dolan). See also Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479,
486 (N.Y. 1994) (noting that when the state acts it must "show a legitimate, sub-
stantial State interest that is closely, causally related to the action undertaken")
(emphasis added), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1961 (1995).
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E. Lucas-The Right Methodology Applied Too Narrowly
Lucas might have completed the puzzle altogether; it
strengthened the analytical bond between the background prin-
ciples of state property law and the reciprocal definition of prop-
erty and the police power. Ironically, the state's own argument
facilitated this salient analytical connection by calling upon the
harm/benefit distinction in its failed attempt to justify a total
deprivation of value.' Yes, said the Court in Lucas, the
harm/benefit distinction matters." But Justice Brennan taught
us in Penn Central that one person's harm is another's bene-
fit.' Thus, the distinction must be connected neither to land-
owner nor regulator assertion, but to the objective reality of the
background principles of state property law. To justify its regu-
lation, South Carolina needed to show by antecedent inquiry
that what Mr. Lucas planned to do (build a house on a residen-
tially platted beach lot)" was never part of his property law
bundle in the first place. South Carolina, as it turns out, could
not meet this burden. 7
With the decision in Lucas, the Court solved the takings puz-
zle by explicitly returning regulatory power to its roots, as a rea-
sonable codification of the sic utere principle, the law of nui-
sance.' This principle was indeed the "helpful clew" that Jus-
tice Sutherland, in Euclid, said it always would be for determin-
ing the acceptable scope of the police power in relation to private
property.6" As I have written before:
With the distracting and unhelpful diminution in value factor
functionally eliminated from the Lucas case, the Court could
see clearly that judicial intervention as a constraint upon the
exercise of police power was not unwarranted judicial activ-
63. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020-22 (1992).
64. See id. at 1022.
65. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 n.30 (1978).
66. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008, 1031-32.
67. See id. at 1031-32; Gideon Kanner, Not with a Bang, but a Giggle: The Settle-
ment of the Lucas Case, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULA-
TORY TAKINGS AFrER DOLAN AND LUCAS 308 (David L. Callies ed., 1996) [hereinafter
TAKINGS].
68. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022-26.
69. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
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ism, but duty borne of the Takings Clause itself. This was not
judicial predilection displacing majority will, but judicial re-
minder within a federalist structure (drawing directly upon a
federalist source-state common law) that ours is not a de-
mocracy simpliciter, but a democracy bounded by human, and
necessarily, property rights.0
This solution does not, as some speculate, "make hash" of fed-
eralism.71 It is both highly respectful of federalism, by substan-
tially defining property in relation to the background principles
of state property law, and attentive to the checking function of
the federal judiciary in a federalist republic. Consistently, feder-
al intervention under the Court's takings puzzle solution wisely
is deferred by ripeness considerations.72 Largely confined to
putting states to the clear identification of its regulatory policy,
federal intervention occasionally-but rarely as a practical mat-
ter-is aimed at ensuring that legislative factions within a state
have not made sudden changes to its law in a way that burdens
particular landowners unfairly or disproportionately. 3
70. Kmiec, supra note 1, at 152. Furthermore, Justice Stewart observed:
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy
property without lawful deprivation ... is in truth a 'personal'
right .... In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the
personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could
have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil
rights has long been recognized.
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (citations omitted).
71. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment
on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 318 (1993).
72. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
73. As Justice Stewart wrote in his concurrence in Hughes v. Washington, 389
U.S. 290 (1967):
We cannot resolve the federal question whether there has been such a
taking without first making a determination [as to whom owned the prop-
erty in question). To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington on that issue arguably conforms to reasonable expectations, we
must of course accept it as conclusive. But to the extent that it constitutes
a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant prece-
dents, no such deference would be appropriate. For a state cannot be per-
mitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property
without due process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively
that the property it has taken never existed at all. Whether the decision
here worked an unpredictable change in state law thus inevitably presents
a federal question for the determination of this Court.
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II. FINISHING THE JOB-A SURVEY OF CASE DECISIONS AND THE
TASK OF COMPLETING THE TAKINGS PUZZLE
The Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan analysis should govern the
methodology of all land-use takings claims. This presently is not
the case. Because Lucas involved a total taking74 and Dolan
and Nollan arose in the contexii of property concessions,75 out-
comes in other settings remain confused by the less-than satis-
factory rulings in Agins" and Penn Central." Because it has
been explained elsewhere why considerations of institutional
competence, predictability, and federalism7 support the wider
Id. at 296-97 (Stewart, J., concurring).
74. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006-07 (1992).
75. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827-28 (1987).
76. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
77. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). But see supra
note 34 (indicating that some states already apply the heightened scrutiny of Nollan
outside the concession/exaction context).
78. See The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163,
274-79 (1992) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. The competence of state courts to strike a
proper balance between individual right and majoritarian desire is manifest in tradi-
tional nuisance analysis. See id. at 275; cf Joseph William Singer, The Reliance In-
terest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 744-48 (1988) (discussing the judicial role
in balancing the property rights of a corporation with the property claim of the com-
munity). As Professor Singer has pointed out, courts "develop moral principles to
govern the proper exercise of power in the marketplace" and are "experts in such
principles." Id. at 747. Nuisance law gradually develops within a precedental system
of law that invites reliance, investment, and initiative.
By way of contrast, state legislative bodies, or their local delegates, are not lim-
ited by prior decision or enactment and are highly responsive to the shifting inter-
ests of their political constituencies. See Leading Cases, supra, at 275. This is too
much of a conflict of interest to overlook. "To allow the state legislature that enacts
a regulation . . . also to determine when the federal constitution will require com-
pensation unduly concentrates power in the hands of the legislature." Id. at 276. No
state or local legislative body can fairly appraise and neutrally balance public desire
and private right.
Without the protection that the Court provides in Lucas [premised upon
the independent handiwork of the state judiciary], a state legislature could
too easily use sleight-of-hand to convert benefit-conferring regulations into
harm-preventing regulations and thus avoid the requirement of compensa-
tion for what would otherwise be a compensable regulatory taking.
Id. at 275 n.55.
I also have previously pointed out the importance of nuisance determinations
being both local and dynamic. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of
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application of Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan, those issues will not be
re-examined in this Article. Rather, in what follows, the focus is
on particular case decisions and how a fuller resolution of the
takings puzzle might exist outside the contextual limits of
Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan.
A. Total Takings Versus Partial Takings-Defining a
Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectation
Lucas solved the takings puzzle in the context of a total tak-
ing.79 These total takings were said to merit special scrutiny
because they were not unlike physical occupations." The Court
admitted that it had "never set forth the justification for this
the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1630 (1988). Only
nuisance law developed gradually over time by a judiciary in the same location as
the property in question can meaningfully distinguish abrupt, reallocative legislative
mischief from proper legislative codification of the subtleties of local ecology or local
conceptions of harm. Also, because nuisance law is dynamic, it allows local communi-
ties to address new or unforeseen threats to the environment.
The fairness of looking to the state judiciary to sort out competing private and
public claims is evident. The Lucas opinion enhances that fairness in two ways. First,
Lucas places on the state the burden of establishing that a landowner's use is nui-
sance-like because the state has the best appraisal of its regulatory interests and the
greatest incentive to demonstrate any private incompatibility with them. See Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1029. Second, Lucas properly reserves some federal supervision of state
nuisance determinations. See id. at 1031-32! Ripeness and abstention doctrines will
hold these occasions to a minimum, but the fact that the Takings Clause is a federal
assurance of private property rights means that it cannot be nonexistent. Such federal
review follows logically from the implicit distinction between the independent reality
of a state's common law of property and the rare possibility that any court, even a
state court, may misapply it. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and
"Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 435-38 (1977) (recognizing the distinction between
state property law and its interpretation); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Tak-
ings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1412-13 (1991) (asserting that federal review im-
plies a federal component to a state definition of property); Barton H. Thompson Jr.,
Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1495-98 (1990) (suggesting federal review for
takings that result from radical reversals of precedent by a state court).
Neither property nor police power is an absolute right; each evolves contextually
and over time. State courts are in the best position to monitor this evolution, and
the federal courts-by recognizing property as largely defined in an "independent
source such as state law," Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)-are
in the best position to assay any takings claim that results from this evolution. This
is true whether the dispute arises from state or federal regulation.
79. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.
80. See id. at 1017.
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rule,"81 but speculated that short of complete deprivation of val-
ue, legislatures need flexibility to adjust the "benefits and bur-
dens of economic life" without having to pay for every change in
general law. 2 Implicit in that speculation was a proper desire
to avoid judicial policy-making-in other words, to keep the fed-
eral courts from becoming super-zoning bodies.s No federal
court should be so enlisted. This appropriate concern, however,
already is well-handled by substantial ripeness requirements
that keep most land-use disputes out of federal courts." Follow-
ing the Court's holding in Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank," a landowner making an "as-
applied" challenge to a regulation must obtain a final decision
from local land-use authorities, and if dissatisfied with that final
decision-or if making a facial challenge-pursue compensation
in state court before appealing to a federal forum.86 In light of
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1017-18.
83. This is the view of Justice Stevens, who dissented in Nollan, Dolan, and
Lucas. For instance, Justice Stevens wrote:
If the Court proposes to have the federal judiciary micro-manage state
decisions of this kind, it is indeed extending its welcome mat to a signifi-
cant new class of litigants. Although there is no reason to believe that
state courts have failed to rise to the task, property owners have surely
found a new friend today.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1061-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 866-67 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. See Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment
Takings Litigation, 11 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 37, 37 (1995).
85. 473 U.S. 172 (1985). As this Article went to press, the Court granted certio-
rari in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996) (considering whether an "as applied" regulatory tak-
ing claim is ripe without a landowner application for theoretically available transfer
of development rights).
86. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186. The final decision requirement is not
applicable to physical occupations. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534-
35 (1992). Some authority states that it is not applicable to dedication and exaction
cases, see Nelson v. City of Lake Oswego, 869 P.2d 350, 353-54 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
Arguably, the final decision requirement is tied to an analysis of economic impact or
diminution in value, although Professor Roberts has argued that it also might be
used to give the government an opportunity to change its mind. See Roberts, supra
note 84, at 45. The final decision requirement also is not required when it would be
futile, although futility is difficult to establish. See Celentano v. City of W. Haven,
815 F. Supp. 561, 568-69 (D. Conn. 1993).
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this well-formed ripeness doctrine, the total taking qualification
is unnecessary for responsible federal judicial administration.
The total taking qualification also fails to provide sufficiently
meaningful legislative flexibility because it is unstable, easily
circumvented, and frequently indefensible in light of reasonable,
investment-backed expectations premised upon the background
principles of state property law." A total taking necessarily im-
plicates the so-called denominator problem-that is, the identifi-
cation of the property interest against which regulatory loss
should be gauged. At first, in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court cal-
culated diminution-in-value in relation to the affected inter-
est.88 Subsequently, in Penn Central, the Court opined that loss
must be calculated in relation to the whole property.89 In
Lucas, the Court admitted that "the rhetorical force of our 'de-
privation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its
precision, because the rule does not make clear the 'property
interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured."0
The Court did not resolve the perplexity but counseled that:
The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the
owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the
State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the
State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the
particular interest in land with respect to which the takings
There is no exception to the requirement that compensation first be pursued in
state court. Every state court is capable of affording such remedy, even absent ex-
plicit statutory or state constitutional authorization, by virtue of the Fifth
Amendment's self-executing nature. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 312-13 (1987).
87. Professor Epstein has suggested that the terminology of investment-backed ex-
pectation is problematic because it leaves donees unprotected. See Epstein, supra note
5, at 1370. This formal objection need not be true, however, as the expectation of a
donee can be logically traced to the investment by purchase or labor of the donor.
88. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Justice Brandeis, in
his dissenting opinion, argued that takings analysis should be performed in reference
to the whole property and not just to the interest affected. See id. at 419 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
89. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1977)
("In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this
Court focuses ... on the ... extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as
a whole.").
90. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
1014 [Vol. 38:995
19971 TAKINGS PUZZLE PIECES 1015
claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value."
In searching for the solution to the denominator problem in
the objective manifestations of ownership as encapsulated in
state law, the Court is on the right track. Significantly, it is a
track that leads directly to the eventual de-emphasis of the total
taking qualifier in Lucas,92 or at least the recognition that
there can be a "total taking of a partial estate"93 based on dis-
tinct, investment-backed expectations. The likelihood was ad-
verted to by the Court in Lucas,94 and, in fact, Lucas has not
been solely confined to the total taking of a total estate con-
text. 5
The significance of reasonable investment-backed expectations
is augmented further by the separate concurring opinion of Jus-
tice Kennedy," who, in light of changes in the Court's composi-
tion,9" is likely to be pivotal in the further deployment of the
91. Id. at 1017 n.7.
92. See id. at 1030.
93. D. Benjamin Barros, Defining 'Property' in the Just Compensation Clause, 63
FORDHAhI L. REV. 1853, 1872 n.99 (1995); see also Layne v. City of Mandeville, 633
So. 2d 608, 611 n.6 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that Lucas allows a fact-specific
inquiry to determine impact on investment-backed expectations, even if the regula-
tion is not a total taking). But see Zealey v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 532
(Wis. 1996) ("We conclude that the United States Supreme Court has never endorsed
a test that 'segments' a contiguous property to determine the relevant parcel; rather
the Court has consistently held that a landowner's property in such a case should
be considered as a whole.") (emphasis added).
94. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
95. See, e.g., M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The
court wrote:
While Lucas involved an alleged 'total taking,' one in which the land
owner was deprived of 'all economically beneficial use' of his land, which
is not true in the present case, the Lucas formulation is useful for ana-
lyzing takings claims involving land use restrictions even when depriva-
tion is not complete. Specifically, in analyzing a governmental action that
allegedly interferes with an owner's land use, there can be no compensa-
ble interference if such land use was not permitted at the time the own-
er took title to the property.
Id. at 1153. The court found that federal mining regulations in place at the time of
acquisition precluded the landowner's taking claim. See id. at 1155.
96. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
97. Justice White, part of the Lucas majority, has since retired, with his seat on the
Court having been filled by Justice Breyer, a Clinton appointee. Of the two dissenting
Justices, Justice Stevens remains on the Court, while Justice Blackmun was replaced
by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Souter filed a separate statement. See id. at 1076.
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Lucas methodology.98 Justice Kennedy understands that the
protection of the Takings Clause would tend "towards circulari-
ty," or, as mentioned before, be rendered a tautology if "[t]he ex-
pectations protected by the Constitution [were not] based on
objective rules and customs that can be understood as reason-
able by all parties involved."99 Recognizing that "nuisance pre-
vention accords with the most common expectations of property
owners who face regulation,""'0 Justice Kennedy would expand
the base upon which reasonable expectations are formed to in-
clude "the whole of our legal tradition."'0 ' It is not entirely
clear what Justice Kennedy meant to include in that description,
but the description implies that in a given case this broader
source of expectation can run in favor of either the landowner or
the regulating entity.0 2 For example, Justice Kennedy indicat-
ed that fragile land resources may justify special regulation not
entirely within the domain of common law nuisance.' 3 On the
other hand, the entirety of the legal tradition also persuaded
Justice Kennedy that the promotion of tourism, so substantively
unlike either nuisance or meaningful environmental concern,
could not suffice as a regulatory justification "without a corre-
sponding duty to compensate."'O° Justice Kennedy was also
skeptical of regulation occurring after investment.'
Because what is considered "property" is largely a state law
issue,"08 fleshing out what counts as a "reasonable investment-
98. For one discussion of Justice Kennedy's significance in future takings cases see
Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in the Supreme Court's
Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1099, 1107-09, 1131-40 (1997), although Pro-
fessor Lazarus, I believe, understates Justice Kennedy's essential agreement with the
majority in Lucas.
99. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
100. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
101. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
102. See generally George P. Smith II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an
Historical Revisionist Theory of Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 694-95
(1995) (suggesting that a landowner's reasonable expectations about property use
should include primarily the sic utere uto principle, as well as the Doctrines of
Waste, Public Trust, Public Nuisance, and Eminent Domain).
103. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
104. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
105. See id. at 1035-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
106. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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backed expectation" should generally be the task of state
courts.0 7 Some statutory modifications are inescapable, so that
government can "go on" in the adjustment of the benefits and
burdens of economic life, but, for the most part, these should be
applied prospectively. The deference of Agins and Penn Central
is unwarranted."' The history of the regulatory state reveals
that the fairness required by the takings inquiry can no more be
presumed than a rational basis.' 9 To this end, there are sev-
eral specific areas in which clarity of public authority and secu-
rity of private investment might be advanced. In these areas,
the phraseology of investment-backed expectation needs to be
reconciled with several parallel, but thus far nonintersecting,
lines of case authority that run through land-use practice."0
Premised upon the intellectually superseded decisions in Penn
Central and Agins, these alternative lines of authority remain
unconsciously at odds with the analytical direction of the Lucas
majority and concurrence, as well as Nollan and Dolan.
1. Clear Affirmation of a Common Law Right To Develop
To illustrate, it is commonly assumed that property ownership
invites, and thus assures, some responsible level of improvement
or development. Yet precisely how are the development rights
associated with the background principles of state property law,
or for that matter, common law property ownership? The ques-
tion is more problematic than it may first appear. Commentators
have noted, for example, that many state decisions "do not rec-
ognize a property interest in either zoning modifications or exist-
ing zoning classifications.""' Case law denying any vested
right in existing public land-use classifications surely does ex-
ist,"2 but just as surely it contradicts the objective, common
107. See supra note 78 (explaining the special competence of state courts over state
or local legislatures or the federal judiciary).
108. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1569 (1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
109. See supra note 33.
110. See infra notes 111-49 and accompanying text.
111. Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, 'Paying" for the Change: Using Eminent
Domain To Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801,
1846 (1995).
112. See, e.g., Bankoff v. Board of Adjustment, 875 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Okla. 1994)
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law premise of Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan."' Indeed, the fact of
this contradiction has led to an overly clever, but faulty, proposi-
tion that Nollan and Dolan might be finessed by the simple
expedient of using formal eminent domain to take the equivalent
of what would have been the dedication condition, and then
"paying" for the property interest, not with cash, but with the
"benefit" or privilege of a development permit."' The authors
of this hypothetical proposal recognize its intuitive implausibili-
ty by admitting that "[wie would think it preposterous, for exam-
ple, to compensate someone for a taking of land by letting him
keep his car." 5 Indeed, it is preposterous. Too much modern
land-use law is erected, courtesy of the highly deferential ratio-
nal basis standard of Agins and Penn Central, not only upon the
proposition that providing a benefit can cure the harm, but also
upon the further mugger-like suggestion that it is all right to let
a scoundrel keep your watch and wallet because he "generally"
let you keep your life! By contrast, Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan are
premised on causation,"' which depends in part upon an as-
(stating that a property owner. has no vested right in the continuation of a zoning
classification); Save Oxnard Shores v. California Coastal Comm'n, 224 Cal. Rptr. 425,
432 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that a California property owner has no vested
right in an existing or anticipated zoning classification).
113. It also tends to create this anomaly: no one owns the property right to devel-
op. Consider in this regard, the Federal Circuit decision in Board of County Supervi-
sors v. United States, 48 F.3d 520 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995), in
which the federal government condemned land over which the county had exacted
concessions from the developer to leave portions in open space, provide storm drains,
and construct other amenities. The county argued that these regulatory concessions
were "property" for purposes of compensation in eminent domain. See id. at 524. The
court thought otherwise, indicating that the developer's concessions merely resulted
from the county's exercise of its police power. See id. Thus, regulatory assertion of
power is not the equivalent of, say, a private restrictive covenant, which would be
compensable in eminent domain. Rather, common law rights to develop remain in
the landowner and would comprise part of the landowner's compensation in eminent
domain. Because the owner's interests can be identified for acquisition purposes in
the condemnation context, there is no reason to leave them insufficiently ac-
knowledged, or wholly undefined, as a result of the undefinable scope of Agins's and
Penn Central's rational basis deference. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-28 (1978).
114. See Kendall & Ryan, supra note 111, at 1816-17.
115. Id. at 1845.
116. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024-25 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
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sessment of the external effects of proposed development under
zoning existing at the time of investment,"' a part of the back-
ground principles of state law.
2. Ownership Should Satisfy the Due Process Property
Predicate
A second line of case authority that is anomalous in light of
Nollan, Dolan, and Lucas makes it virtually impossible for a
landowner pursuing a substantive due process claim to prove the
predicate existence of an affected property right. In a number of
circuits, the landowner must establish that the regulating entity
"lacks all discretion to deny issuance of the permit or to with-
hold its approval. Any significant discretion conferred upon the
local agency defeats the claim of a property interest.""8 Be-
cause it is highly unlikely that a landowner will be heard, let
alone prevail, in these jurisdictions, this hardly coincides with
"reasonable investment-backed expectations," whether premised
upon Justice Scalia's conception of the traditional common law
of nuisance".9 or Justice Kennedy's "the whole of our legal tra-
dition."2 ' Not every circuit is this ungenerous; a number of cir-
cuits properly assume the existence of a property right from the
fact of ownership itself and proceed to the merits.' 2 ' The exis-
483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987).
117. See, e.g., Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994)
(holding that proper calculation of park fee exaction depends upon the zoning specif-
ic to the site).
118. Gardner v. Mayor of Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992); see also
Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1989) (discussing the city's dis-
cretion in issuing a certificate of occupancy); RRI Realty Corp. v. Village of
Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 915-18 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing the role of issuing
authorities' discretion in entitlement analysis); Carolan v. City of Kansas City, 813
F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir. 1987) (discussing the city's discretion in issuing building per-
mits and certificates of occupancy).
119. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022-26.
120. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
121. See, e.g., Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that the mu-
nicipal council's denial of a building permit for personal reasons violated due pro-
cess); Scudder v. Town of Greendale, 704 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
zoning board's denial of building permits was not arbitrary or capricious); Cordeco
Dev. Corp. v. Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1976) (affirming the district court's
finding that the issuing authority abused its discretion in failing to grant the
applicant's permit in a timely manner); South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d
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tence of this circuit conflict, however, warrants Supreme Court
review. Assuming the conflict is taken up, the standard of re-
view for substantive due process claims deserves realignment
with Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan. As Justice Scalia observed in
Nollan, "the right to build on one's own property-even though
its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting require-
ments-cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental bene-
fit'." 2 The "reasonable investment-backed expectations" of
ownership deserve greater due process sanctuary from arbitrary
forms of regulation.
Recognizing ownership as satisfying the due process property
predicate might also yield a further salutary advantage-the re-
internment of substantive due process review by virtue of its
merger into takings analysis. The Lochner episode made plain
that federal courts are not evaluators of the substance of legisla-
tive policy." Rather, the courts act as ultimate guarantors of
individual rights (including individual property rights)."
Continuing the .overlapping case authority of substantive due
process and takings confuses, rather than clarifies, this judicial
role. A soundly conceived takings jurisprudence returns due pro-
cess to its procedural focus, 25 and potentially eliminates multi-
ple subdeformities affecting the application of ripeness, finality,
and remedial considerations in constitutional adjudication, as
courts struggle with whether they have a due process or takings
claim before them. 2 '
Takings and substantive due process were joined by judicial
5 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the zoning board's actions were consistent with the
objectives of a zoning resolution).
122. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.2 (1987).
123. See supra text accompanying note 13.
124. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 73 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our du-
ty... is to sustain the statute as not being in conflict with the Federal Constitution.").
125. See, for example, Gosnell v. City of Troy, 59 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1995), in
which a developer's substantive due process cause of action against the city was re-
jected because that cause of action was abolished after Lochner, and the developer
should have filed under the Takings Clause. The court further stated that "a munici-
pality may bring residential development to a halt for strong reasons or weak rea-
sons. If the latter, the municipality has to pay for the privilege." Id.
126. See generally Kenneth B. Bley, Substantive Due Process and Land Use: The
Alternative to a Takings Claim, in TAKINGS, supra note 67, at 289 (discussing due
process claims against land-use regulations).
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incorporation,' 27 yet they remain bafflingly separate. As Ken-
neth Bley has noted, the first prong of the takings formulation
in Agins is really a due process inquiry.121 Whether regulation
is "arbitrary or capricious" is the forerunner of "advancing state
interests.' 29 Unfortunately, this language has meant both ev-
erything and nothing. Most often, however, the language has
tended toward the nothing that characterizes deferential ratio-
nal basis review. Deference, too, has meant many things. A few
courts have held that substantive due process is violated only if
the action complained of is irrational;30 for others, only if gov-
ernInental action shocks the judicial conscience;'3 ' for still oth-
ers, a land-use regulator can be irrational only if he has no dis-
cretion;..2 for some, substantive due process violations can oc-
cur in the exercise of discretion;3 3 paying attention to what
the neighbors want may also violate substantive due
process,' but then again, maybe it is appropriate to consider
127. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)
(asserting that the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment includes
protection against the taking of private property for public use).
128. See Bley, supra note 126, at 291.
129. See id.
130. See, e.g., Anderson v. Douglas County, 4 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the county's decision to deny a permit to allow a landowner to "thin spread"
contaminated soil was rational); Nester Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio,
964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[The threshold for establishing the requisite 'abuse
of government power' is a high one indeed."); Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman
Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[The [zoning] decision can be said to
deny substantive due process only if it is irrational.").
131. See, e.g., Licari v. Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 350 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that
defendant's conduct was found not to be "sufficiently 'conscious-shocking'"); G.M.
Eiig'rs & Assocs. v. West Bloomfield Township, 922 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1990)
("The test [for illegal official acts] asks whether the alleged conduct shocks the con-
science of the court.").
132. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 842 F. Supp. 183, 187 (D. Md. 1994),
af'd, 48 F.3d 810 (4th Cir. 1995).
133. See, e.g., Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111,
1116 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that zoning bodies must exercise "reasonable" discre-
tion in their decisions); Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1540
(11th Cir. 1991) ("[A] plaintiff may claim that the zoning applied to his property
goes too far and destroys the value of his property... [so] that it amounts to a
taking... without due process of law."); Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d
1488, 1498 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "substantive due process claims may in-
volve an assessment of whether the action was a reasonable and proper exercise of
police power").
134. See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d
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the neighbor's desires." 5
The heightened scrutiny of Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan can end
this confusion. Takings analysis can displace the more spurious
and suspect judicial avenue of substantive due process. The is-
sue in litigation becomes whether a regulation substantially ad-
vances a legitimate state interest, with "substantially advanc-
ing" and "legitimacy" measured, as it should have been all along,
not against the happenstance of judicial insight, but against the
background principles of a particular state's nuisance and prop-
erty law. 136
3. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations and "Vested
Rights"
There is also a need to reconcile the concept of reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectation with various "vested rights" doc-
trines. As noted earlier, landowners presently have little formal
basis for certainty of use based solely on existing regulation or
common law at time of acquisition."7 However, even cases that
1496, 1508 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that the city's actions under influence of political
pressure from neighbors might have been arbitrary and irrational); Geo Tech Recla-
mation Indus. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662, 666 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that a state
law authorizing the consideration of public sentiment failed to satisfy rational basis
review because it provided no "meaningful standard by which the [zoning authority
was] to measure public sentiment."); Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308,
312 (4th Cir. 1989) ("fIf. . .the City Council denied [the developer's] permit appli-
cation solely in an effort to placate those members of the public who expressed 'reli-
gious objection' . . . it thereby acted 'arbitrarily' and 'capriciously'.").
135. See, e.g., Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1392 (11th Cir.
1993) ('[Blecause the City's action was substantially related to the general welfare,
its actions did not violate [the developer's] substantive due process rights."); Mid-
night Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 685 (3d Cir. 1991) ("ITihe
state may consider community sentiment in evaluating applications for licenses if
community objection is based on legitimate state interests . . ").
136. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1021-22 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987).
137. This is the venerable chestnut that no one has a vested right to the continua-
tion of existing zoning. See 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §
4.28 (3d ed. 1986). This rule has been applied to both owners, see Orange Lake
Assocs. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1994); Aquino v. Tobriner, 298
F.2d 674, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1961), and neighbors, see Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414,
429 (2d Cir. 1978). Like so many chestnuts, however, they are not always swal-
lowed. See Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 716 F.2d 1194, 1200 (8th Cir. 1994) (giving
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deny use or development rights premised upon the zoning exist-
ing at acquisition occasionally find a vested right when there is
subsequent and substantial good faith reliance upon a building
permit.138 Nevertheless, uncertainty abounds. Some jurisdic-
tions especially aggravate this uncertainty by the so-called
"pending ordinance" doctrine pursuant to which landowners are
denied permits under announced, but unenacted, laws. 139 Cut-
ting in the opposite direction, Nollan articulates the view that
even some restrictions in place at the time of acquisition do not
necessarily bind the owner.140 The Court in Nollan wrote: "So
long as the Commission could not have deprived the prior own-
ers of the easement without compensating them, the prior own-
ers must be understood to have transferred their full property
rights in conveying the lot.""" The Nollan observation in con-
text is correct, but putting it together with the prior observation
that landowners are often denied building permits on the basis
of announced but unenacted laws," the general proposition
that emerges is: a landowner is neither guaranteed anything by
existing regulation, nor necessarily bound by it. This is a pre-
scription for anarchy, not investment.
The level of indefiniteness surrounding vested rights doctrine is
too high and therefore promotes litigation unnecessarily. Perhaps
common law doctrine governing private land transactions might
be employed to advance certainty. In particular, the concept of
bona fide purchasers taking title free of private encumbrances
a landowner a vested right to zoning under Iowa law).
138. See Bankoff v. Board of Adjustment, 875 P.2d 1138, 1142 (Okla. 1994) (stating
that courts will protect a landowner's interests "where he has made substantial ex-
penditures or committed himself to a substantial disadvantage in reliance thereon").
139. For a description of the doctrine, see DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, ZONING AND PLAN-
NING DESKBOOK § 6.05 (3d ed. 1996); for a partisan defense of the notion that land-
owners can be bound by unenacted policy expression, see Frank I. Michelman, Prop-
erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensa-
tion" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1238 (1967), restated in Michelnan, supra note
71, at 314-15.
140. Justice Scalia wrote that the Nollans' property rights were not "altered be-
cause they acquired the land well after the Commission had begun to carry out its
policy [of demanding lateral 'easements as a condition of development]." Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833-34 n.2 (1987).
141. Id.
142. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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absent actual or constructive notice of the encumbrance (usually
through proper recordation) might, for example, be extended to
public restriction. Assuming the broader application of Lucas,
Nollan, and Dolan, as argued for here, incorporating some consid-
eration of actual or constructive notice (or lack thereof) of existing
regulation arguably makes the same economic sense as discour-
aging private investment from "coming to the nuisance." In
143. Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706-07 (Ariz. 1972). The
presence or absence of regulation at the time of investment, be it acquisition or lat-
er improvement, has been grasped by the Federal Circuit in its own formulation of
investment-backed expectations as limiting "takings recoveries to owners who [can]
demonstrate that they bought [or improved] their property in reliance on a state of
affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime." Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Cf.
Wesley J. Liebeler & Armen Alchien, Constitutional Baselines by Virtual Contract: A
General Theory and Its Application to Regulatory Takings, 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV.
153 (1994) (suggesting that courts might ascertain investment-backed expectations or
constitutional baselines independent of state positive law by employing common law
as a surrogate for a hypothetical ex ante contract as it would maximize the value of
"specialized assets," that is, those whose value is interdependent with another, espe-
cially by reason of location). The Liebeler and Alchien theory, as well as related
ones depending upon some form of economic efficiency balancing, see, e.g., Smith,
supra note 102, is unlikely to be attractive to a Court sensitive to a restrained judi-
cial role or unwilling to undertake complex economic analysis that many will see as
Lochner reborn.
By contrast, the Loveladies approach and the approach suggested in this Article
and by Justice Scalia in Lucas, is designed less as an invitation to judicial instruc-
tion in policy efficiency, than as a better calibration of reciprocal property and police
power interests, allowing legislative policy-making (even if thought economically un-
wise by judges, economists, or even judicial economists) so long as it is respectful of
prior private investment and reliance. As Benjamin Barros nicely explains:
For example, suppose that a regulation prohibits the filling of wetlands.
P1, who owned property affected by the regulation before the regulation
took effect, may have a taking claim against the government. Whether
compensation will be paid or not, the regulation can be seen as taking
the right to fill the wetlands from P1 and reserving the right to prohibit
the filling of wetlands in the state. If P2 later bought the property from
P1, the bundle of rights purchased by P2 would not include the right
that allows the filling of wetlands, and P2 would not have a taking claim
against the government. The price P2 paid for the property should [prop-
erly, as in "coming to the nuisance" theory] reflect the effect of the regu-
lation, and the regulation would not interfere with P2's investment-
backed expectations. Thus, the investment-backed expectations test asks
whether the property interests affected by the regulation were held by
the property owner or reserved in the state-the same inquiry suggested
by the nuisance exception to the Lucas categorical rule.
Barros, supra note 93, at 1873 n.100. Mr. Barros has stated the general rule, but it
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this regard, the notice factor easily might be included as an ele-
ment of the government's burden to prove by antecedent inquiry
that the background principles of state property law do not sup-
port the landowner's particular development claim.
Again, however, although notice is important, it should not be
dispositive. The fundamental issue remains whether a given
landowner is disproportionately singled out. Suggestions in
case 144 and commentary4 ' that the landowner should assume
the burden of regulatory risk stand fundamentally in contradis-
tinction to the Court's reattachment of takings jurisprudence in
Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan to the objective reality of the back-
ground principles of state property law. As Justice Scalia opined
in Nollan, the right to develop is not a "government benefit" to
be taken away on notice. 46 So too, the relative size of land-
owner expenditure in reliance upon a permit skirts the Fifth
Amendment's underlying "singling out" concern 147 which again
is qualified by Justice Scalia's proposition that some deprivations cannot be categori-
cally made from P1 at all. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (indicating
that P1 cannot have the equivalent of an easement interest taken, and if it is, then
P1 can transfer the cause of action for such a taking to P2). The general rule is
also qualified by Justice Kennedy's observation that some nuisances or environmen-
tal conditions may not be immediately knowable, and therefore, regulation may not
be in place at the time of investment, even if the nuisance-like condition then exists.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment). Arguably, subsequent regulatory steps to address
such a preexisting nuisance-like condition would not constitute a taking. Cf. Depart-
ment of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1995) (finding that a landowner did
not have a reasonable investment-backed expectation in a mill site used for storage).
In The Mill, even though storage was not a prohibited use at the time of purchase,
the radioactive contamination existed at the site at that time and the subsequent
regulation merely mirrored the later-understood health threats. See id. at 1001. The
court reasoned that "Ulust as a property owner 'on notice' of government regulatory
authority cannot reasonably expect to avoid regulation, neither can a property owner
reasonably expect to put property to a use that constitutes a nuisance . . . ." Id.
144. See Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (treating the
issue of notice as a threshold bar to recovery); Atlas Enters. Ltd. Partnership v.
United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 704, 708 (1995) ("Generally, when an owner buys property
with knowledge of restrictions upon the development of that property, he assumes
the risk of any economic loss.").
145. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Takings Law, in
TAKINGS, supra note 67, at 119, 129.
146. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833-84 n.2 (1987).
147. See Mandelker, supra note 145, at 129-30 (considering landowner reliance as a
factor in recognizing investment-backed expectations).
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can only be answered by antecedent inquiry. State cases decided
since Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan seem to grasp the point that fac-
tors of notice and relative amounts invested are not dispositive
of the takings issue, 4 ' although the judicial record is still
mixed.49
B. Physical Occupation Was Not the Whole Point-Heightened
Scrutiny Should Apply Generally to Land-Use Takings Cases
Nollan and Dolan apply heightened scrutiny when a landown-
er is required to dedicate a property interest in order to obtain a
development permit.15 In Nollan, the Court unequivocally re-
jected the rational basis standard, noting that "our verbal for-
mulations in the takings field... have required that the regula-
tion 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought
to be achieved,... not that 'the State "could rationally have
decided" that the measure adopted might achieve the State's
objective.""'5 The Court further noted that it viewed "the Fifth
Amendment's Property Clause to be more than a pleading re-
quirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise
in cleverness and imagination."'52 Interestingly, the Court
148. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 804 F. Supp. 1316, 1328
(D. Nev. 1992) (protecting an investment-backed expectation and rejecting "caveat
emptor" analogy to regulated market); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 51
(1994) (finding that a reasonable investor would not have been on notice); Lopes v.
City of Peabody, 629 N.E.2d 1312, 1314-15 (Mass. 1994) (holding that a landowner
had a right to challenge the validity of a wetlands zoning ordinance affecting his
property, even though he purchased the land with knowledge of the ordinance's re-
strictions); Somol v. Board of Adjustment, 649 A.2d 422, 428 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1994) (holding that the right to a variance was not lost as a result of
purchaser's knowledge); Hoberg v. City of Bellevue, 884 P.2d 1339, 1342 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that the mere fact that a purchaser of land had actual or con-
structive knowledge of an area variance does not, without more, justify a denial of
such a variance); see generally 3 EDWARD ZIEGLER, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING
AND PLANNING § 38.06 (4th ed. 1993) (discussing the effect of a self-created hardship
on a request for a variance).
149. See, e.g., Dodd v. Hood River County, 855 P.2d 608, 616 (Or. 1993) (prohibit-
ing house construction in a forest zone because regulatory notice precluded invest-
ment-backed expectations).
150. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
151. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980) and 483 U.S. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
152. Id. at 841.
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stressed that it was "inclined to be particularly careful about the
adjective where the actual conveyance of property is made a con-
dition to the lifting of a land use restriction .... .1 3 Dolan con-
firmed that the Court meant what it said, but again, this was in
the circumstances of a permit condition of a land dedication. Is
the Court not at all interested in being adverbially careful out-
side of this context?
It should be. Heightened scrutiny should apply outside the
area of imposed land dedications, as a notable, though not yet
overwhelming, number of decisions suggest." Heightened
scrutiny thus has been applied when individual landowners
have been required to undertake activity or to supply benefits
for an overall community need that the landowner did not
cause.'55 Older cases similarly have found takings when land-
use restrictions were imposed to sustain distinctly governmental
functions, such as flood control,15 airports,157 and public
schools.'58 Additionally, pre-Nollan/Dolan case law has looked
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. See Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 482 (N.Y. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1961 (1995); supra note 62; infra notes 212-17 and accompanying
text. I am indebted to Professor Edward Ziegler of the University of Denver for
bringing to my attention the case development trend discussed in the text.
155. See, e.g., Manocherian, 643 N.E.2d at 479 (striking down an obligation to pro-
vide renewal leases for a favored hospital); Guimont v. Clarke, 854 P.2d 1 (Wash.
1993) (holding that a low income tenant relocation assistance statute violated the
owners' substantive due process rights); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 830 P.2d 318
(Wash. 1992) (finding that an ordinance prohibiting destruction of low income hous-
ing without the payment of a fee violated the landowners' substantive due process
rights); Seawall Assocs. v. New York City, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989) (holding
that a law that required the maintenance of single-room-only facilities for the
homeless is facially invalid as a regulatory taking); Property Owners Ass'n v.
Township of N. Bergen, 378 A.2d 25 (N.J. 1977) (striking down an ordinance impos-
ing subsidy on housing for senior citizens); Aspen-Tarpon Springs Ltd. Partnership v.
Stuart, 635 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that monetary assistance
for tenant relocation costs was a regulatory taking).
156. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Madison County Drainage Bd., 898 F.
Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (holding that a taking had occurred when a utility was
singled out to bury pipelines for general drainage needs); Hager v. Louisville & Jef-
ferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1953) (finding that
a taking had occurred as a result of a zoning resolution designating private land for
flood basin storage).
157. See, e.g., Sneed v. County of Riverside, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1963) (finding that a taking had occurred when the city had instituted restrictive
overflight zoning).
158. See, e.g., Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983) (holding that
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unfavorably on the singling out of one owner for the particular
benefit of a neighbor."5 9 Finally, courts also have applied
heightened scrutiny when restrictions validly address
externalities caused by the landowner but lack meaningful com-
pensating benefits for the landowner.6 ' The common thread
uniting all these cases is not physical occupation or a dedication
requirement, but the finding that a burden on a single landown-
er is disproportionate in light of background state property law
principles.
1. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City 6 1-- The Facts
In considering the application of heightened scrutiny to a
broader range of takings cases, the recent California Supreme
Court decision in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City supplies a useful
backdrop. From the early 1970s until 1988, Richard Ehrlich
constructed and operated a private tennis club and recreational
facility in Culver City, California.'62 The club began to lose
money in 1981, and it ultimately closed for financial reasons in
1988.163 The month after it closed, Mr. Ehrlich applied for a
zoning change to allow construction of a thirty-unit condomini-
um complex on the site."6 Although the city initially explored
purchasing the closed tennis club, it concluded that it lacked the
there was a taking when private land was zoned for a public school).
159. See, e.g., Heck v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 397 A.2d 15, 19 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979)
(invalidating the denial of a permit for a home addition that would have blocked a
neighbor's view); cf Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269,
1274 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Nollan and asserting that it was improper to require a
landowner to provide a drainage system for his neighbors' benefit).
160. See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 52-53 (1994) (finding a sub-
stantial loss of value resulting from wetlands regulation and compensating the owner
for the loss). In Florida Rock Industries v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995), the Federal Circuit inquired whether there
were "direct compensating benefits accruing to the property, and others similarly
situated, flowing from the regulatory environment? Or are benefits, if any, general
and widely shared through the community and the society, while the costs are fo-
cused on a few?" Id. at 1571.
161. 911 P.2d 429 (Cal.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 299 (1996).
162. See id. at 433-34.
163. See id. at 434.
164. See id.
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necessary funds."s Instead, the city simply disapproved the
zone change to residential, noting a need for recreational facili-
ties.'66 While the city deliberated, however, Mr. Ehrlich demol-
ished the structure and donated the sports equipment to the
city."'67 Thereafter, the city agreed to Mr. Ehrlich's proposed
rezoning to residential use on condition that he pay the city
$280,000 to be used for public recreational facilities.'68 In addi-
tion, Mr. Ehrlich was required to donate $33,200 to the "Art in
Public Places" fund, pursuant to a local ordinance that required
new residential, commercial, and industrial projects valued over
a certain amount to donate a percentage of that value to "public
art.""'69 Also pursuant to local ordinance, Mr. Ehrlich was re-
quired to pay $30,000 for local park and recreational facilities
needed to serve the residents of his new condominium develop-
ment.
7 0
Mr. Ehrlich chose not to challenge the park donation, but he
paid the art and recreational fees under protest. 17' The trial
court set aside the recreational, but not the art fee. 72 The
court of appeals upheld both fees.' Following Dolan,'74 the
United*States Supreme Court remanded,7 5 but the court of ap-
peals found both fees to be "roughly proportional" to the needs
generated by the project. 7 ' In a divided opinion, the California
Supreme Court reversed in part, questioning the analysis sup-
porting the recreational fee, but finding the art fee to be consti-
tutional.'77
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See iL
168. See id. at 434-35.
169. See id. at 435.
170. See id. at 435 n.2.
171. See id. at 435.
172. See id.
173. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 483 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993), vacated, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994).
174. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
175. See Ehrlich, 512 U.S. at 1231.
176. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, No. B055523, slip op. at 24 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 8, 1994).
177. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 449-50.
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2. The Startling Outcome
Prior to the California Supreme Court's decision, I fully ex-
pected a complete and decisive reversal of the appellate decision,
rather than the more mixed outcome that the state high court
produced. The notion that property owners must maintain pri-
vate recreational uses or supply "art" on their private property
for public enjoyment is a novel one, even under the common law
of California. The California Court of Appeals, in a wisely un-
published opinion, asserted that "it is beyond dispute that the
City has a legitimate governmental interest in making available
community recreational facilities."178 Reading this, one is
tempted to say, sure, that's right, a city does have unquestioned
authority to buy park land, put up public tennis courts, and tax
all of its residents for these amenities. On second reading, how-
ever, it is apparent that the city is not asserting this well-estab-
lished municipal authority, but rather is asserting the extraor-
dinary notion that once a private landowner has undertaken a
permitted common law use, like building a private tennis court,
it must either continue that use, or pay the city for permission
to stop.
3. The Flaw
The appellate court's analysis illustrates the danger of not
perceiving the relationship between Lucas's reliance upon the
common law or background principles of state property law and
Dolan's inquiry into whether a landowner can in any credible
way be said to have caused a harm that "roughly proportional"
police power can then legitimately address."' The California
Supreme Court reversed the recreational fee, but only, it said,
because the lower court calculated the "loss" incorrectly.80 Ac-
cording to the state supreme court, "[tihe loss which the city
seeks to mitigate by levying the contested recreational fee is not
the loss of any particular recreational facility, but the loss of
178. Ehrlich, No. B055523, slip op. at 19.
179. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
180. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 449-50.
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property reserved for private recreational use."'' The assump-
tion inherent in that statement is that the landowner may own
his improvements privately, but the common law right to devel-
op is wholly public. A similar unconventional idea was urged by
the economist Henry George in the nineteenth century,'82 but
it was so greatly incongruous with American common law tradi-
tion that it never took root. In academic writing over a decade
and a half ago, I reformulated the Georgian concept of "un-
earned increment"--that is, value associated with undeveloped
land traceable to neighboring community or private improve-
ment-to proffer an alternative land-use control model." Un-
der this hypothetical model, landowners generally would trade
their unearned increment for relative freedom of use selection
and site design. Every academic delights when classroom ideas
resonate in the real world, but it is hardly proportionately fair
for Culver City's less generous version of this idea to begin and
end with Mr. Ehrlich. The California Supreme Court asserted
that "it is well accepted in both the case and statutory law that
the discontinuance of a private land use can have a significant
impact justifying a monetary exaction to alleviate it."" The
court volunteered no accompanying citation of authority.
No direct support exists in California land-use law, or even in
the law of eminent domain for the court's proposition. Quite the
contrary, the common law has always been suspicious of impos-
ing affirmative duties generally,'85 let alone affirmative duties
that arise by a type of self-imposed adverse possession-hang
around long enough as a private tennis court and don't expect to
be anything else, ever. Moreover, even if one assumed that the
city could ipso facto confiscate the value associated with volun-
tarily undertaken and unsubsidized private use, it is not abun-
dantly clear how, on remand, the lower court is to calculate this
181. Id. at 448.
182. See HENRY GEORGE, OUR LAND AND LAND POLICY: SPEECHES, LECTURES AND
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 108-12 (1902).
183. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise
Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 115-29 (1981).
184. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 446.
185. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAmES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 887 (3d ed.
1993) (discussing the reluctance of the courts to approve affirmative covenants).
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loss of value to the city. The state supreme court speculated that
the city's value may be the "additional administrative expenses
incurred in redesignating other property within Culver City for
recreational use,"'86 or then again, maybe the city's value is
the "additional costs of attracting the development of comparable
private recreational facilities." 7 The state court really did not
address this issue, other than to remind the city-and the re-
viewing lower court now stuck with the problem-that "[tihe
determination of such a fee will, of course, require[s] ... specific
findings supported by substantial evidence.""8
4. Justice Kennard's Near-Perfect Dissent and Less-Wise
Concurrence
In her separate concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice
Kennard perceived the novelty (and in that novelty the unfair-
ness) of the majority view in Ehrlich.' Justice Kennard's per-
ceptive ability was aided by reference to the fundamental pur-
pose of the Takings Clause-avoiding disproportionate public
burdens.' In her words:
This constitutional protection does not evaporate when we
discontinue a use of our property that we gratuitously under-
took and that the government could not constitutionally have
required us to continue, no matter how greatly the communi-
ty may have benefited from that use. 9'
Justice Kennard reasoned that it was questionable, even on
conventional takings grounds, whether Culver City could have
confined the use of Mr. Ehrlich's property to private recreational
uses, as those uses have proven to be economically nonviable."9 2
Apart from that, however, she likened the majority's finding that
Mr. Ehrlich had a specialized continuing duty to stay in a particu-
lar use to discrininatory "spot zoning"-which is instructive, early
186. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 449.
187. Id. at 450.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 461-68 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 463 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 468 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 467 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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common law terminology manifesting the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee against being singled out disproportionately.93
Interestingly, Justice Kennard did not decide whether the es-
sential nexus required by Nollan was also absent from the
Culver City recreational fee imposition. The majority thought
Nollan's essential nexus was satisfied merely with its unsup-
ported assumption that "the discontinuance of a private land
use" is unquestionably related to public need. 94 With more
subtlety, Justice Kennard pondered whether Nollan really re-
solved this question. She wrote:
The United States Supreme Court has not yet clarified
whether "the projected impact" [for essential nexus purposes]
includes only positive effects such as the additional burdens
that the new development will impose on the community (in
this case, the increased demand for city services resulting
from the addition of 30 townhouses) or also negative effects
such as the reduction in the total area of land zoned for a
particular use (in this case, the reduction in land designated
for recreational uses) or the loss of public benefits from the
preexisting use of the land (in this case, the benefits City res-
idents derived from the use of the athletic facilities).195
Justice Kennard arguably was correct in stating that Nollan did
not resolve this question,'96 but Dolan did.'97 Not surprising-
ly, therefore, she found that Dolan's rough proportionality stan-
dard was not met because, as already discussed, it was fatuous
to suggest under existing California common law that anything
other than the additional burdens of the new development could
be fairly attributable to Mr. Ehrlich.9 '
This is not to say that cessation of a publicly valued or en-
joyed private use is not, in a pure economic sense, an
externality.' According to the majority, Mr. Ehrlich made a
193. See id. at 467 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 446.
195. Id. at 466 n.2 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
196. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Supreme Court has not
defined the meaning of "projected impact").
197. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394 (1994) (suggesting that a
development's "projected impact" could include the reduction of greenway space).
198. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
199. See generally DUKEIhIER & KRIER, supra note 185, at 49-50 (discussing land
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decision that adversely affected citizens of Culver City not by
harming them (in the nuisance sense), but by withdrawing a
desired benefit."' It might be desirable for communities to
hold landowners accountable for the withdrawal of privately
supplied benefits when transaction costs prevent the landowner
from considering the worth of continuing such benefits. Yet, two
points need to be made. First, considerable factual doubt exists
in this case, and. probably in many regulatory cases, whether
transaction costs or simply lack of demand impede the continua-
tion of privately supplied benefits. After all, Culver Citians were
not exactly leaping over the nets to patronize Richard Ehrlich's
tennis club.0 1 But, even if there is a perceived transaction cost
barrier, isn't removing the barrier (that is, the inalienability of
regulatory control) a better alternative?
For present purposes, however, a second point is more crucial.
Externality or not in terms of formal economic analysis, the dec-
lination to continue to supply a private use that also yields a
public benefit is not presently cognizable under common law
property conceptions; in short, it is neither a nuisance nor inher-
ent in the background principles of state property law. Without
those background principles, *the Nollan/Dolan nexus require-
ments are cut adrift and the reciprocal definitions of police pow-
er and property become entangled. The heightened scrutiny of
Nollan and Dolan requires the background principles of property
law referenced in Lucas2. to work. If there is a latent defect in
the original Nollan opinion, it is that the passage that "assumed
without deciding" that the Nollans could have been required to
leave a "view spot" on their property for the benefit of passers-
by0 . misleads readers into thinking that such a power actually
exists. The passage is nominally an anti-Lochner.4 assurance
designed to disclaim any judicial interest in the substance of the
use and externalities).
200. See generally Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 448 (discussing the loss to the city).
201. See generally id. at 434 (indicating a lack of patronage through a discussion
the club's financial losses and management and maintenance problems).
202. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024-31 (1992).
203. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987).
204. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); supra notes 12-15 and accom-
panying text.
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ultimate social policy sought to be advanced. As Dolan and
Lucas effectively reveal, however, whatever the social goal, the
judiciary does have some interest: namely, ensuring that land-
use legislation does not disproportionately burden any single
landowner. And, in this, burdens are calculated by refer-
ence-not to judicial predilection-but to the nuisance and prop-
erty law of the state."5
This poses a further question, one not without difficulty in
application. If the legitimacy of Takings Clause supervision of
the land-use legislative process depends upon an independent
source of state law, is not that source dynamic, and therefore
capable of evolving through case law or statute to include the
imposition of affirmative duties on landowners? Yes, and here
the teaching of Lochner"6 applies. The Court must admit the
possibility of the common law evolving to accept affirmative obli-
gations, followed by the statutory law of the state eventually
mirroring that development. The loss of freedom implicit in such
coerced duty might be anathema to individual members of the
Court, but that, except at the extreme, is only a policy matter.
Lucas's linkage of the concept of reasonable investment-backed
expectation to state law 7 allows this evolutionary change to
occur within individual communities. "Reasonableness," howev-
er, when linked to "expectation" also implies that, absent ex-
traordinary or sudden environmental or public danger, such
common law or statutory change should be wholly prospec-
tive.0 8 Support for this prospective qualification on state law
205. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
206. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45; see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
207. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
208. Recall the earlier discussion about defining protectable property interests large-
ly in relation to the regulation in effect at the time of investment acquisition or im-
provement and the common law, thus giving greater certainty to vested and common
law rights to develop. See supra notes 33, 143 and accompanying text. The kind of
affirmative duties anticipated in that discussion would require compensation, but
once established, subsequent investors would understand that such duties would be
continuing, and market interest and price would be adjusted in subsequent transac-
tions (positively or negatively depending upon the wisdom of the duty imposed) ac-
cordingly. Ironically, it may be the counterfeit concept of "new property" that retards
the ability of communities to take full advantage of the dynamic of the common law
or statutory modifications thereto. In this regard, the Court's insistence on applying
due process formalism to statutory benefit acts as a disincentive to statutory change
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can be drawn analogously from the conceptual framework un-
derlying the Contract Clause,"9 which is best understood as
prospective in its application,21 ° absent some extraordinary or
temporary need such as the pervasive financial collapse of the
Great Depression. 1'
5. Fees and Dedications-One and the Same-Well, Almost
Disappointingly, no member of the California Supreme Court
applied the Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny analysis to the
"public art" fee. Reviewed under the rational basis standard, the
majority asserted that the required public art donations fell
"well within the authority of the city to impose."212 The court
reasoned that such art fees are easily sustainable because they
were the equivalent of other traditional land-use requirements
and were more or less generally applicable." 3 Neither basis
suffices to deny heightened scrutiny review. Before exploring
why, however, mention should be made, of an important bit of
ground-clearing that the California Supreme Court did accom-
plish. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's remand in
Ehrlich,"4 some state and federal courts drew an artificial dis-
tinction between dedications and monetary exactions for purpos-
es of heightened scrutiny. For example, cases from California
that could faithfully (and only once) pay compensation to the preregulatory change
owner, and not repeatedly pay (albeit indirectly) through the cost of imposed admin-
istrative process. Thus, when the Court wrote in Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring)), that "[w]hile the legislature may elect not to confer
a property interest . . . it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such
an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards [imposed by
the Court],'" the Court essentially ossified common law or statutory right, although
the state legislature may have intended that the created right be conditional or
qualified by, say, the later imposition of an affirmative duty.
209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any... Law impair-
ing the Obligation of Contracts.").
210. See Douglas W. Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to
the Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 527-29 (1987).
211. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-27 (1934).
212. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (Cal.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 299 (1996).
213. See id.
214. 512 U.S. 1231 (1994).
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and various federal circuits lamely had denied heightened scru-
tiny for exactions on the basis of the lack of physical invasion
associated with monetary demands. 15 This kind of "thingness"
view of property is enough to give a long-time property instruc-
tor the willies, as it suggests that far too many judges appar-
ently forgot or failed to comprehend the conceptual nature of
property taught to them in their first year of law school. Impor-
tantly, the California Supreme Court "reject[ed] the proposition
that Notlan and Dolan are entirely without application to mone-
tary exactions," 216 and the court applied the heightened stan-
dard of review to fees, at least in those circumstances in which
the court believed that the municipal power was likely to be
extortionate. 1 '
That is the good news. The bad news is that the court con-
cluded that the art fee was not an extortionate circumstance. 18
According to the court, the art fee was akin to a "traditional
land-use" regulation.29 This was error. Although it is true that
aesthetic regulation has gained greater acceptability in state
courts, 220 such regulation often is sustained in relation to man-
ifest harm such as a decline in property value.22' In addition,
the United States Supreme Court in Lucas suggested that spe-
cial caution be exercised when the police power pursues aesthet-
222ic, rather than "core" health and safety purposes. At any
215. See, e.g., Blue Jeans Equities W. v. City of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
114, 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (maintaining that heightened 1crutiny is limited to
possessory rather than regulatory takings); see also Commercial Builders v. City of
Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "the level of scrutiny to
be applied to regulations that do not constitute a physical encroachment on land"
remains low) (citing St. Bartholomew's Church v. New York City, 914 F.2d 348, 357
n.6 (2d Cir. 1990)); Adolph v. Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 854 F.2d 732, 737
(5th Cir. 1988)).
216. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 444.
217. See id. at 449.
218. See id. at 450.
219. See id.
220. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 681 (N.C. 1982) (overruling previous
cases to the extent that they prohibited regulation based upon aesthetic consider-
ations alone); see also Michael Pace, Note, Aesthetic Regulation: A New General Rule,
90 W. VA. L. REV. 581 (1988) (discussing the development of aesthetic regulation).
221. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 309-10 (Mo.
1970) (holding that a city could deny a building permit in order to sustain property
values and promote general welfare).
222. The Court suggested this caution in light of "[tihe many statutes on the
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rate, it is questionable whether "public art fees" really are the
equivalent, as the California Supreme Court claims, to "minimal
building setbacks, parking and lighting conditions, [etc.]." z2
Setbacks and parking requirements are allied closely with the
negative burdens caused or created by particular development,
and thus these "traditional" controls bear little similarity to "art
fees." To this midwesterner at least, it seems extraordinary that
any claimed analytical connection could exist between condomin-
ium development and a hankering for public art.2  Courts
should willingly listen to the argument, of course, but the fair-
ness called for by the Fifth Amendment suggests that the listen-
ing or the scrutiny must be heightened and bound by the state's
background property law principles.
6. Individual Versus Legislative Assessment-Why Should It
Matter?
Apart from the substantive nature of the art fees, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court also premised its deferential review upon the
fact that the art fees were not individually assessed development
exactions. 25 Justice Kennard concurred, reasoning that '[the
art in public places fee was imposed under a municipal ordi-
nance of general applicability."2 '6 The distinction between gen-
eral and individual requirements is one that troubles a number
of areas of constitutional law. Under First Amendment analysis,
religious practices cannot be singled out for disfavor but, as a
matter of constitutional doctrine, can be prohibited as a conse-
quence of generally applicable law.227 Yet, singling out is a ques-
books, both state and federal, that provide for the use of eminent domain to impose
servitudes on private scenic lands." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1018-19 (1992).
223. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 450.
224. In northern Indiana and its environs, we are just plain happy if we can get
the barn painted between snows.
225. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 450.
226. Id. at 464 (Kennard, J., concurring).
227. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990). Congress has
sought to apply a different standard pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), the constitutionality of which is under review in the
federal courts. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct. 293 (1996).
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question of degree and circumstance. For example, a city may
think that it is just generally trying to rid its streets and alleys
of dead animal carcasses, but if the impact of the law-when
conjoined with some illicit legislative motivation-is felt by a
single religion engaging in animal sacrifice, then the ordinance
is constitutionally unacceptable.' Similar problems arise in
limited public fora where content, but not viewpoint, discrimina-
tion is permissible. 9 Differentiating viewpoint from content
discrimination, however, seems merely to depend upon how
finely substantive topic lines are drawn." °
Factually, the art fee in Ehrlich can be similarly assailed. The
fee does not apply to every property owner or even to every new
development in Culver City. Justice Mosk nevertheless argued
that this selective application did not differ from manifold reve-
nue raising schemes that impose fees or taxes on some individu-
als, but not others."' The majority responded to Justice Mosk,
who would have applied a deferential standard of review to all
the development fees in the case, by separating the individual-
ized and discretionary recreational fee from the more general
public art fee requirementY
With all due respect, the court has hold of the thread when
what it really needs is a better grasp of the sleeve. Yes, where
fees are individually imposed in a discretionary fashion, there is
considerable risk that a landowner may 'be singled out
disproportionately. As the religion and speech cases23 and
228. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524
(1993) (invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting the ritual slaughter of animals).
229. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510,
2516 (1995) (holding that the university could not deny funding to a religious stu-
dent group because that denial amounted to viewpoint discrimination); Lamb's Cha-
pel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (holding that
the school district could not deny a church access to school premises after hours be-
cause of the religious content of films that the church wished to show).
230. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517 (discussing the university's argument that
it was discriminating on the subject of culture, not the viewpoint of religion).
231. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 458 (Cal.) (Mosk, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 299 (1996).
232. See id. at 447-51 (analyzing the respective fees differently and in separate
parts of the opinion).
233. See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
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even Loretto,"4 suggest, however, this answer is not complete.
In Loretto, the Court held that general legislation authorizing
physical occupation of a small portion of property belonging to a
relatively broad class of owners was unconstitutional. 5 Jus-
tice Mosk purported to distinguish Loretto on the basis of the
"thingness" offensiveness of physical occupations,2 36 but again,
this is just so much doctrinal assertion. When a generally enact-
ed fee is structured for collection as part of a permit-issuing pro-
cess, as opposed to a tax or special assessment to be collected
independent of landowner need for municipal approval, a risk of
extortion is present. It is likely in these circumstances, as it is
in the case of the individually imposed fee, that a particular
landowner is being singled out as a convenient revenue target to
supply desirable public benefits, rather than, applying Dolan, to
rectify proportionately the causal impacts of a particular devel-
opment measured against the background principles of state
property law. As Justice Scalia wrote in his dissenting opinion
in Pennell v. City of San Jose,"7 these are simply occasions "to
establish a [privately funded] welfare program."238 Justice
Scalia continued:
Singling out [individual landowners] to be the transferors
may be within our traditional constitutional notions of fair-
ness, [only when] they can plausibly be regarded as the source
or the beneficiary of the [land-use] problem. Once such a con-
nection is no longer required, however, there is no end to the
social transformations that can be accomplished by so-called
"regulation," at great expense to the democratic process."
Denying heightened scrutiny because of the more general na-
ture of the art fee is contrary to Dolan. Dolan illustrated that
constitutional unfairness can be the product of general legisla-
tive enactment. The bikepath and greenway dedications required
by Tigard did, in fact, originate in the city's legislatively codified
234. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
235. See id. at 421.
236. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 454 (Mosk, J., concurring).
237. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
238. Id. at 22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Community Development Code.24 Yet, Dolan blurred this fact
somewhat by hiding its significance under the label "adjudica-
tive."24 Thus, the Court in Dolan seemingly exempts from
heightened scrutiny land-use regulations that "involve[ ] essen-
tially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the
city." 2 What is legislative and what is adjudicative in land-
use control has been the subject of extended debate in the state
courts." Ironically, given Dolan's prominence, the best dis-
cernment of the legislative/adjudicative line occurs in an opinion
by the Oregon Supreme Court. In Fasano v. Board of County
Commissioners,2' the Oregon court wrote:
Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a
specific piece of property are usually an exercise of legislative
authority, are subject to limited review, and may only be at-
tacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse of
authority. On the other hand, a determination whether the
permissible use of a specific piece of property should be
changed is usually an exercise of judicial authority and its
propriety is subject to an altogether different [and more de-
manding] test.245
Although legislative developments in Oregon have superseded
Fasano,2 46 the clarity of its insight perhaps better expresses the
distinction that the United States Supreme Court sought to high-
light in Dolan than does the Court's own legislative and adjudica-
tive labels. In this regard, it should matter little whether a partic-
ular land-use regulation originates with a legislative or an adjudi-
cative pronouncement. 7 What counts is whether the legislative
240. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 378 (1994).
241. Id. at 385.
242. Id.
243. Compare Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973) (dis-
cussing a zone amendment as an adjudicative land-use control), with Arnel Dev. Co.
v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 569 (Cal. 1980) (discussing a zone amendment
as a legislative land-use control). Cf Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing:
Piecemeal Land Controls As a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 839,
846 (1983) (theorizing that local zoning decisions should not be classed as either
"legislative" or "judicial").
244. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
245. Id. at 26.
246. See Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603 P.2d 771, 778 (Or. 1979).
247. See J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas County, 887 P.2d 360, 365 n.1 (Or. Ct.
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determination has been brought to bear on particular property,
either through the permitting and rezoning process or through
initial mapping and classification. Again, the Court's significant
ripeness requirements will keep the federal judiciary free of im-
proper legislative interference. Challenges to permit-issuance
conditions almost always will be "as applied" in nature, thereby
necessitating a final decision and denial of any available adminis-
trative relief, such as a variance. There can be, however, "fa-
cial" challenges to the inclusion of property within a general land-
use map or classification, but such challenges are rare.2 When
they do occur, they require litigation in state court regarding the
availability of compensation under state law."0
It can be hoped that the United States Supreme Court will
soon take up a case to indicate that heightened scrutiny ought
not be avoided by the unmindful recital of legislative and adjudi-
cative labels or the related difference clung to by the California
Supreme Court in Ehrlich:"1 that a land-use requirement is
general in nature. The United States Supreme Court missed an
opportunity to provide such clarification when it denied review
in Parking Association of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta." In
App. 1994) (noting that a "condition on the development of particular property is not
converted into something other than that by reason of legislation that requires it to
be imposed").
248. See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 353
n.9 (1986) (requiring reapplication when the initial proposal was "grandiose"); Wil-
liamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 192-93
(1985) (requiring finality, including variances, that can relieve the impact of a final
decision).
249. See Jonathan Belcher, Exploring the Latitude of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council. Local Control of Surface Mining, 17 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 165,
186 n.151 (1993) (stating that most takings challenges are "as-applied").
250. See Roberts, supra note 84, at 37 (citing Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194) (stating
that when making a facial takings challenge, the compensation prong of the William-
son ripeness test requires that the property owner seek compensation in state court).
But compare Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498 (9th
Cir. 1990) (applying ripeness analysis in a facial takings challenge), with Triple G
Landfills, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 977 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that it is
not necessary to apply the ripeness test in facial takings challenges). See generally
Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 722-23 (11th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing be-
tween as-applied and facial challenges).
251. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 299 (1996).
252. 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2268 (1995).
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Parking Association, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a leg-
islatively imposed requirement that a certain class of parking
lots must landscape at least ten percent of their paved areas and
have at least one tree for every eight parking spaces. 3 The
Georgia Supreme Court applied rational basis review, ultimately
finding the ordinance to be neither a physical nor a regulatory
taking.' Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, and noting a
conflict among the jurisdictions over the applicability of height-
ened scrutiny, Justices Thomas, joined by Justice O'Connor,
wrote:
It is hardly surprising that some courts have applied [Dolan's]
rough proportionality test even when considering a legislative
enactment. It is not clear why the existence of a taking should
turn on the type of governmental entity responsible for the
taking. A city council can take property just as well as a plan-
ning commission can. Moreover, the general applicability of
the ordinance should not be relevant in a takings analysis....
The distinction between sweeping legislative takings and par-
ticularized administrative takings appears to be a distinction
without a constitutional difference.=
In calling for the uniform application of heightened scrutiny,
neither these Justices, nor I, suggest that property rights prevail
uniformly over the police power. The Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause is not a newly minted part of the Contract with America
or the "sagebrush rebellion" or any other more singularly fo-
cused property rights movement. The Fifth Amendment is a
means of ensuring a fair relationship between citizen and gov-
ernment; that relationship can, and should, favor the public in-
terest in appropriate cases. Thus, in their dissent to the denial
of review in Parking Association, Justices Thomas and O'Connor
cited two cases in which heightened scrutiny was applied to leg-
islative enactments, one finding a taking and the other not.t 6
253. See id. at 201-02.
254. See id.
255. Parking Ass'n, 115 S. Ct. at 2268-69 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
256. Compare Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994)
(applying heightened scrutiny to uphold a recreational fee in light of the park needs
created by a proposed development), with Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643
N.E.2d 479, 483 (N.Y. 1994) (finding that a statute requiring renewal leases was an
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Responsible legislative and administrative action mitigating the
impact or needs caused by new development is not unwarranted.
Such responsible governmental behavior is advanced by specify-
ing that rational basis review applies to legislative choice of poli-
cy, but not to its application to specific parcels. As Justices
Thomas and O'Connor observed: "[a]lthough Dolan purports to
be an exception to Agins, the logic of these two cases appears to
point in different directions. The lower courts should not have to
struggle to make sense of this tension in our case law."257
The Ehrlich decision illustrates the confusion born of this
struggle. It is easily resolved in favor of "a uniform, clear and
reasonably definitive [heightened] standard of review in [all land
-use] takings cases."258 The Lucas methodology and allocation
of proof burdens, together with the Nollan and Dolan nexus re-
quirements, invite just such clarity. It is time that the "verbal
formulation" of "substantially advancing a legitimate govern-
mental interest" be given unmistakable meaning.
CONCLUSION
As noted, some courts already have perceived the value of the
takings solution articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan, and have applied the proof burdens
and heightened scrutiny from these cases to land-use takings
claims generally. This trend should continue. It would be facil-
itated were Agins and Penn Central formally superseded and a
clearly stated methodology of review outlined by the Court.
What would such an outline look like or entail? By way of sum-
mary, the following is a sketch of the procedure for takings liti-
gation (whether or not styled as a takings, substantive due pro-
cess, or vested rights claim). To begin, the landowner would
have the burden of producing evidence establishing: (1) a prima
facie case of investment-backed expectation (ownership if refer-
ring to the acquisition investment alone and/or improvement
unconstitutional taking under heightened scrutiny because it "draped" an unjustifi-
able burden "disproportionately on the particular owners' shoulders"), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1961 (1995).
257. Parking Ass'n, 115 S. Ct. at 2269 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
258. Manocherian, 643 N.E.2d at 483.
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expenditure if referring to development expenditure) either with
regard to a segment of the property if that segment is separately
identifiable under state property law or if not, with regard to the
property in its entirety; (2) that such an investment-backed ex-
pectation was reasonable in light of the totality of state property
law in existence at the time of investment; and (3) that a change
in law or other regulatory action (e.g., denial of permit) has frus-
trated this reasonable expectation.
Upon making this prima facie showing, the regulating entity
would then have the burden of proof to establish that the regula-
tion is justified by antecedent inquiry into "background princi-
ples of [state] nuisance and property law," including as an ele-
ment thereof the landowner's actual or constructive notice of law
existing (though not pending) at the time of investment. Ordi-
narily, this showing would succeed if (1) the regulatory prohibi-
tion was not categorically off-limits to the state (e.g., uncompen-
sated physical occupation) and (2) the state could demonstrate
that the prohibition of the intended use was necessary to avoid
substantial harm to public or private lands and resources, which
harm outweighs the social value of the intended use and cannot
be avoided responsibly by other means. Showing the lack of
available "other means" would be satisfied by reliance upon the
causation principle, aptly incorporated in the essential nexus
and rough proportionality aspects of Nollan and Dolan."9 Be-
cause of established ripeness standards, which implement im-
portant values of federalism and federal judicial restraint, this
inquiry would largely occur in state court with that court apply-
ing heightened scrutiny. Were state courts inundated with tak-
ings claims, as some of the Court's dissenters have alarmingly
theorized, the common law concept of damnum absque injur-
ia260 could be employed.26'
The Supreme Court has done its work by supplying a resolu-
259. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386-91 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
260. Harm without legal injury.
261. The requirement in common law that intentional nuisances also constitute a
substantial harm serves similar purposes. See generally CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra
note 33, § 7.2 (defining nuisance as "an 'unreasonable' activity or condition on the
defendant's land that 'substantially' or 'unreasonably' interferes with the plaintiffs
use and enjoyment of his land").
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tion of the takings puzzle that respects both private right and
public need. The missing pieces or complications discussed in
this Article are partially attribufable, as Justices Thomas and
O'Connor have observed, to a few inconsistencies remaining
within Court doctrine.2 62 There is also the inevitable
sluggishness of doctrinal application in state and lower federal
courts. The Supreme Court can promote the realization of its
well-considered reattachment of takings jurisprudence to the
natural or common law reality of property, and the reciprocal
definition of property and the police power by forthrightly ex-
tending the Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan methodology to all land-
use takings disputes.
Nothing the Court can do, however, will illuminate fully the
inherently indeterminate nature of property and police power
concepts. Natural law can do only so much. The rest depends
upon prudential judgment exercised against an unknown future.
The genius of a Takings Clause applied largely or presumptively
by reference to state property law, especially state common law,
developments is that it neither treats particular specifications of
private property as absolute rights nor as licenses revocable by
unsupervised police power. Rather, the natural law respects the
character of a local community as it has defined itself chiefly
within state judge-made precedent, rather than solely and defer-
entially in the too often acquisitive or exclusionary immediacy of
legislative enactment. The building of any community takes
time, and the incremental nature of common law adjudication
reasonably supplies this opportunity and, with it, the promise of
fairness called for by the Fifth Amendment.
262. See Parking Ass'n, 115 S. Ct. at 2269 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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